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INTRODUCTION

Research results fall under two headings, dealing with: (1)

economic criteria and (2) recreation data. The greatest time

commitment and effort -was made in the former area, and a journal

article on economic criteria "was published. This article will

serve as the principal part of the present report. Activities

are described below under each of the headings:

ECONOMIC CRITERIA

The principal research result of the present project takes the

form of a journal article, "Pricing Pollution and Other Negative

Externalities"
 9 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,

Vol. 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 252-266. A reprint is enclosed.

Prior to the publication of the reference article, a number

of basic flaws existed in the relevant economic theory. These

included:

(1) An implicit assumption of fixed proportions between

conventional product and pollution outputs.

(2) A mistaken symmetry in compensation and bribery as means

of internalization.

(3) A confusion between internalization and rationing.

ClO Misconceptions on the possibilities of blackmail in

pollution control.

The author worked through a consistent line of analysis to

correct all the above flaws, the second of which was embodied in

received theory in the forms of the Coase Theorem. The Coase

Theorem states that ownership of a polluting factor can be assigned

to either the pollution originator or the pollution receiver -without

affecting the allocation of resources* This Theorem is, in general,

false, as the author has now shown. At least two kinds of errors

were made by the proponents of the Coase Theorem. The first was

to begin with property rights to an assumed polluting factor,

rather than to the pollution output itself. The second was to

consider marginal profits only, to the exclusion of total profits.

Certain critics of the Coase Theorem has previously made the error

of considering total profits only, to the exclusion of marginal

profits. In the present article of reference, the author showed

that the two profit concepts can be reconciled only in the case

of internalization by compensation, not with internalization by

bribery.

A sequel to the above article will appear in the Bell Journal

of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 4 (Spring, 1973). This

second piece will further elaborate the necessary conditions for

proper assignment of property rights.

RECREATION MEASUREMENT

Important Variables

Application of economic criteria to a comprehensive measure of

demand for water-oriented recreation must relate to quantity of

recreation consumed, measured as either activity days or visits,

to the prices paid, measured as travel expenses to the recreation

site plus admission fees. At least three effects must be reflected

in shift parameters: long term changes in income levels, natural
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site quality, especially water quality, and congestion* Particular

kinds of recreation, such as boating or camping, require additional

expenditures by recreationists for equipment and the damand prices

of these kinds of recreation must be reckonned higher as a result.

To the extent that strict complementarity exixts among the goods

consumed, such as travel to the site and admission9 demand is for

the combined total of complementary goods. This means that

changing the policy variable, admission fees, will have predictible

effects on distance travelled and hence on attendance.

The Simplest Case; No Shift Parameters

The empirical approach implied by the above summary of the problem

is easiest to frame when the shift parameters are not important.

Thus, a reference case may be conceived in which a series of water-

based recreation sites are available at different ditances from a

series of population centers. If all of the recreation sites are

large enough that there is no crowding (no congestion effects) and

site natural qualities the same everywhere, then there is no reason

to expect recreationists to go to any site other than the nearest

one. They have no incentive to spend time and money going further.

Since the sites are at different distances from the population

centers, travel costs are different and so is attendance, as a

fraction of the population served. In this simple case, none of

the three shift parameters are important and a demand curve can

be constructed from a simple regression of population participation

against distance from site, with each combination of population

center and recreation site taken as one observation. The dependent

variable is the participation rate and the independent variable is

the distance travelled. Distance travelled is converted to dollars

-3­

per user-day using established travel time relationships. Observa­

tions could be made for the season as a whole or for selected days,,

but would have to be made at the same time period for all sites*

The shift parameter due to changes in recreationistsT income

would be reduced to unimportance by taking the observations within

a short period of time, e.g. a recreation season, or a year, over

the course of which no important income change is expected to take

place. The other two shift parameters, quality and crowding, were

eliminated by the special considerations introduced in constructing

the model.

Incorporation of Shift Parameters

In a practical situation, there is no possibility that the shift

parameters can be held fixed. A general formulation is then the one

used in the present analysist Participation rates (of population

centers) in each of the recreation classifications at a given site

are set up as functions of

(1) Distance travelled by recreationalists to the site. The

most comprehensive formulation would take account of the distance

travelled by each individual. Since this variable is being used in

a linear regression model, however, the implicit assumption of

linearity over the relevant range makes equally valid the use of

the weighted average distance travelled at each site and for particular

days or time periods.

(2) Total recreation use [in whatever recreation category) at

all sites. This variable gives a measure of the extent of crowding.

On major holidays during the summer, on;e would expect the total

recreation use to be greatest. It would be less on interveining

weekends, still less during the week and, of course, drop near zero

-14.

at off-season times.

(3) Proximity to population. This variable normalizes crowding

effects in that it is expressed as the ratio of population to distance9

distance being measured from the center of the population to the

recreation site9 with finite limits on distances considered ac­

cording to type of use. For example9 the limit on day use is set at

200 miles.

(4) Natural site quality* This variable refers to natural

attributes of the site9 as distinguished from those created by

crowding or an absence of crowding* No attempt is made to measure

it directly9 though values can be imputed through the use of dummy

variables. Thus* in a regression across all sites* observations

applicable to any one site are given a separate variable which does

not exist for any other site. The regression coefficient of this

variable gives an index of quality

Regression analysis. Variable (1) sets up the demand relation­

ship and should have a negative coefficient. Variables (2} and (3)

in combination deal with the crowding phenomenon. The coefficient

of variable (2) should be positive, but variable (2) is hypothesized

to have a greater effect on attendance at sites distant from popula­

tion centers than at those close by. Recreation sites close to

population centers will experience the effects of crowding sooner

than will more distant locations. For this reason, it is necessary

to introduce variable (3), which increases in proportion to effective

proximity of population. The effect of variable (3) will be greatest

for close-in recreation sites and should have a negative coefficient

that will serve as a correction on the effects of variable [2). It

is important to note that both variables (2) and (3) will introduce
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scale effects. Variable (2) will be larger the greater the supply

of recreation facilities; variable (3) will be greater the greater

the number of potential users of recreation facilities. Hence9 the

above model should be adaptable to various geographic areas beyond

the Lake Erie Basin.

Variable (4) takes account of the shift effects of natural site

quality. The coefficient of (4) may be either positive or negative.

Its relative significance is all that matters for the present model.

No shift variable for income level is necessary if observations are

made within the same year, but would be required with observations

extending over several years time.

It will be noted that daily observations are necessary for the

application of the above model. Differences in crowding cannot be

detected using variable (2) unless differences in total recreation

use for all sites can be observed. This means, in particular,, that

annual visitation averages or totals are not useful for the analysis^

nor is it possible to substitute year-by-year attendance data. Income

effects become important over longer periods of time, as do changes in

site quality. Year-by-year comparisons should be made to distinguish

income and quality effects, particularly to identify effects arising

from pollution. But such year«by-year analyses cannot be conducted

unless crowding effects are properly identified through within-year

analysis, as previously described.

Recreation data

Recreation data meeting the needs of the above model were collected,

at least for selected days, in Ohio in 1958 and 1963 and in Michigan

1963. After extensive investigations in both states, however, it was

found impossible to obtain these data. In Ohio, the original figures
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had been discarded and averages published. In Michigan5 some of the

original data "were found on IBM cards but it proved impossible to

get all that were collected or to get the information off the cards

that existed* As in the case of Ohio, the only data available took

the form of aggregates in published reports. Thus, the result of

these investigations was to establish that the empirical base for

analysis of the preceding variables was not available*

CONCLUSION

A reconstruction of economic criteria for evaluating the quality

effects of pollution was completed and published* An econometric

framework was developed and an investigation made of data sources

for evaluating recreation variables. The theoretical construction

constitutes the principal contribution of the research project*

The econometric model awaits testing when adequate data becomes

available.
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externalities 
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1. introduction
252 / RICHARD A. TYBOUT
Pricing pollution and other negative 
externalities 
Richard A. Tybout 
Professor of Economics 
The Ohio State University 
Equilibrium conditions are described for pollution or "externalities of 
production" treated as substitute products. The results are contrasted 
with those based on traditionally assumed fixed proportions between 
product and waste outputs. The "neutrality of bribery or compensation" 
argument is refuted. With linear homogeneous production functions, 
compensation leads to exhaustion of product; bribery does not. Only 
certain selected production functions and conditions can lead to positive 
aggregate profits in a bribe-paying industry. Requirements are de­
scribed. The analysis is applied to a number of related issues: the 
blackmail problem, third party pricing, and public goods aspects. 
• Discommodities are generally externalities. The incentive is to 
disown rather than to own, to avoid rather than to ration. But avoid­
ing and disowning are becoming more difficult as population and 
GNP grow. So it is that economic theory faces a problem of increas­
ing magnitude: the allocation of negative externalities. 
Intuitively, one would expect all of the familiar rules of market 
operation to apply to discommodities, except in reverse. Supply 
should be negatively sloped. Demand should be positively sloped. 
And the originator of a discommodity should pay the receiver to 
take it off his hands. But economic theory is not so constructed at 
the moment. An imposing part of received theory on the economics 
of pollution asserts that legal responsibility can be assigned to either 
the pollution originators or to those damaged without affecting the 
allocation of resources. Either way, it is held, the parties could 
negotiate a monetary settlement that would lead to identical waste 
output in the absence of transactions costs. 
The argument originated with R. H. Coase and has been de­
veloped in a series of supporting and qualifying articles.1 It has 
recently appeared in what is perhaps the leading scholarly monograph 
Richard A. Tybout received the B.Ch.E. degree from the University of 
Delaware (1943), the M.S.E. in chemical engineering (1947) and the M.A. in 
economics (1949), both from the University of Michigan, and the Ph.D. in 
economics (1952), also from that institution. Professor Tybout served as a price 
economist with the Office of Price Stabilization from 1951-1952 and has held 
professorial positions at The Ohio State University since 1954. He has published 
extensively on subjects ranging from transportation economics to environmental 
problems. 
The author wishes to thank the U. S. Office of Water Resources Research 
for financial assistance and J. Hayden Boyd, Allen V. Kneese, and Robert E. 
Kuenne for review of an earlier version of the manuscript. Sole responsibility for 
the results rests, of course, with the author. 
1
 See Coase [5]; and Buchanan and Stubblebine [4], Davis and Whinston 
 [7], and Wellisz [15]. 
on the economics of pollution,2 As noted above, neutrality is claimed 
only in the absence of transactions costs. This disclaimer limits con­
sideration to private goods, and the argument will be evaluated in 
that context, though a final part of the present article will extend the 
theory developed here into public goods. A second limitation, as 
often implicit as explicit, is that indirect effects of the distribution of 
income on demand are ignored.3 In this sense, the analysis is con­
ducted in a partial equilibrium context. Finally, we shall be con­
cerned with only unilateral, as opposed to multilateral, externalities.4 
Others5 have pointed to certain anomalies in the Coase argument, 
though their criticisms imply an alternative kind of symmetry, i.e., 
that compensation and bribery are equally workable market alterna­
tives. The objection they make is to that part of the thesis that pre­
dicts the same allocation of resources with either payment alternative. 
The main conclusion of the present paper is that the transaction 
for internalizing a negative externality cannot, in general, run either 
way. We shall attempt to show that viable market operation re­
quires that an internalizing payment must in general take the form 
of compensation running from the discommodity originator to the 
damaged party. A transaction in the opposite direction, known as 
bribery, cannot exist except in rare cases dependent on fortuitous 
circumstances. Section 2 presents an equilibrium formulation with 
the externality treated as a substitute product. Section 3 summarizes 
and restates in a more general way the argument for neutrality of 
compensation and bribery, or the "Coase Theorem," as we shall 
call it. Section 4 gives the analytical basis for the author's conclusion 
that bribery and compensation are far from symmetrical. Section 5 
deals with a number of related issues, largely theoretical and largely 
raised by discussions in the literature on the Coase Theorem. 
The theoretical analysis and the conclusions of the present work 
appear in the context of pollution control. Nevertheless, it is hoped 
that the analysis of bribery may be suggestive for such diverse topics 
as the economics of crime and the logic of the agricultural soil bank 
program. The reference is to the special circumstances that surround 
a situation where payment is made for not doing something, as de­
scribed in the present analysis of bribery. 
• A standard treatment of multiproduct commodity pricing pro­
vides the basis for the theory of internalization. For positive ex­
ternalities, the results are the same as in conventional commodities 
markets, though the externalities literature has not been so developed. 
For negative externalities, the results are unfamiliar. 
A general-purpose statement of the optimization problem can be 
made with externality / , either a commodity or a discommodity, to 
be internalized. The originator, A, of J sees the classical production 
2
 See Kneese and Bower [11], pp. 98-109. 
3
 The effects of compensation and bribery are, of course, not neutral when the 
distribution of income affects output decisions. For a discussion of this case, see 
Dolbear [8]. 
4
 For discussion of some of the problems involved with multilateral external­
ities, see Davis and Whinston [6]. 
5
 See Boyd [2], Bramhall and Mills [3], and Wellisz [15].
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problem as 
Maximize TA = PAXA d= PJXJ — wLA ~ rCA (1) 
Subject to XA ~ F(Xj,LA,CA) = 0. (2) 
The receiver, B, of J sees it as 
Maximize irH = PBXH =F /VAV — w>Z,y* — rC« (3) 
Subject to XB - G(Xj,LB>CH) = 0. (4) 
Conventional products A and B are produced in quantities XA 
and X/i and sold for prices PA and PB. There are two inputs, labor, L, 
and capital, C, priced at wage rate w and interest rate r. A quantity 
Xj of the externality J is produced by /4 and received by B. The 
internalization price is Pj. The sign convention before the J variable 
is to be interpreted symmetrically. Thus, if / is a positive externality, 
the plus sign in (1) and the minus sign in (3) apply. If J is a negative 
externality, the signs are reversed. We assume that prices are viewed 
parametrically by all parties and constant returns to scale obtain 
throughout. Second-order conditions are those required for quasi-
concavity. 
Internalization takes place through the establishment of markets 
that produce a positive price Pj in place of the pre-internalization 
price Pj = 0. J. E. Meade's celebrated example of externality, the 
production of honey from nectar in apple blossoms, provides an ex­
ample of a positive externality.6 Interpret commodity A as apples, 
commodity B as honey, and externality J as nectar; J = TV, with the 
plus sign before the second term on the right hand side of (1) and a 
minus in the same position in (3). Internalization then produces the 
familiar results 
dXA 
PN= - PA (6) 
6X 
PN = Pa . (7) 
dXN 
One conspicuous difference is that Meade designed his analysis 
to deal with indirect as well as direct effects. The latter are the only 
effects of interest here. More important from the standpoint of ex­
ternalities, however, is the way in which the commodity nectar is 
treated. Meade introduced no such commodity explicitly. Using our 
notation, he employed the following production functions in place 
of our (2) and (4): 
XA ~~ HA(LA,CA) = 0 (8) 
XB- H,£XA,LH,CB) = 0. (9) 
In effect, (8) and (9) require that apples and nectar be produced as 
»\ • » / • 
strictly joint products, i.e., XN = kXA and — - = k.7 The present 
dXA 
fiSee[13]. 
7
 Meade finds a tax needed on honey production in the amount (using our 
notation) of: 
 In our formulation, the tax is254 / RICHARD A. TYBOUT
formulation, of course, allows the conventional commodities and the 
externality to be viewed as substitute products. 
Now, reverse the externality and consider the case of pollution. 
Interpret J as P and use the minus sign before Pp in (1) and the 
plus sign before PP in (3). These sign changes now state that the 
polluter, industry A, must pay a price equal to PP for each unit of 
pollution produced. The price (effluent tax) is paid to industry B 
for damages. We can imagine that industry A is located upstream 
of industry B. The former produces commodity A and pollution P. 
The latter produces commodity B and involuntarily receives pollution 
in the course of using river water. Pollution has a negative effect on 
the production of commodity B. The first-order conditions of maxi­
mization are the same as before except for the following new inter­
nalization price conditions: 
Pp = PA (10) 
dXP 
P P = -PB -• (11) 
dXP 
Compare equations (6) and (7). Since prices are everywhere posi­
tive, the marginal production conditions must be of opposite sign in 
(10) and (11) from what they were in (6) and (7). Our intuition is 
further confirmed by analyzing supply and demand conditions in the 
neighborhood of equilibrium. See the summary of production and 
market conditions in Tables 1 and 2.8 
PNXN = 
The two formulations are equivalent if 
XN 
and this will be the case when 
XN 3XN 
8
 The first-order conditions for maximization of equation (1) subject to (2) 
derived using a Lagrangean multiplier X are: 
dF 
-w-j-X—- = 0 (i) 
OLA 
dF 
-r+ X—- = 0 (ii) 
OCA 
dF 
PA-\ = Q (iv) 
XA - F(XJ,LA,CA) = 0. (v) 
The effect of a small change in PN is found by solution of the following system 
(where superscripts designate partial differentiation), based on equations (i) PRICING OF POLLUTION / 255 
These results were, of course, all implicit in the statement of the 
internalization problem in equations (1) through (4), but this state­
ment was not arbitrary. The results conform to the underlying utility 
relationships one would use to define commodities (positive exter­
nalities) and discommodities (negative externalities). Thus, in output 
y4-output / space, there are indifference curves with slope 
dXA\ (dU/dXj) (12) 
\dX, / UQ (dU/dXA) ' dXj
Since A is a conventional commodity, > 0. When J=N3dTA 
dU dU 
> 0. When J = P, < 0. Compare the production condi­
dXj dXj 
tions for industry A in Table 1. Analogous relationships can be de­
fined in output B-inpntJ space.9 
Internalization of the negative externality was conducted above 
by the process of compensation. Bribery internalizes by making the 
through (v): 
r &L* 
o 
FCAXN o 
dCA 
BPN 
0 
FXNXJ, o dXN 
dPN 
- 1 
0 0 - 1 
dXA 0 
dPN 
FXN -1 0 d\ 0 
Let |Z)| denote the determinant formed from the matrix of coefficients. Then, 
dXN -12)381 
D\ 
L
. Quasi-concavity implies that the signs of unbordered Hessians 
follow the rule (~1)8, where s is the number of columns or rows. See Kuenne 
[12], pp. 181-82. The above matrix expanded by cofactors gives the third-order 
principal minor preceded by a negative sign: \D\ = — \Du,^\, which is an 
unbordered Hessian following the same sign convention. Therefore \D\ > 0. 
The same sort of expansion gives | DM | = — 11 Z)33I 44I 551 < 0. Hence > 0. 
This is, of course, the slope of a supply curve for a conventional commodity in 
the neighborhood of equilibrium. By the use of symmetry, other results can be 
quickly derived from the same mathematical framework. Thus, with J = P, the 
negative sign applies in (iii) and the ( — 1) is replaced by a (+1) in the solutions 
vector, thus giving the slope of the pollution supply curve  — - < 0. Industry 
dPp 
B can be handled in the same way. Replace F with G and A with B, then proceed 
as before. The sign convention in (iii) is reversed to give slopes of the demand 
d XAT d Xp 
curves —  - < 0 and -— > 0 in industry B. 
OPN OPP 
' With Xj as an input, it is necessary to solve (12) for X/s marginal utility: 
^IL - _ dU (dXA (i) 
dXA\dXj/u0 
Substitute (i) in a relationship analogous to (12) to obtain: 
BXB\ _ ___ dU/dXj _ dU/dXA/dXA\ 
dXj/uo ~ dU/dXB ~~ dU/dXB\dXj)UQ'256 / RICHARD A. TYBOUT 
TABLE 1 
OPTIMIZATION CONDITIONS 
COMMODITY 
A 
INDUSTRY 
NECTAR 
9XA 
axN 
< 0 SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS PN PRECEDED BY+ 
3XB 
3XN 
> 0 
POLLUTION 
3XA 
dXp 
> 0 JOINT PRODUCTS PP PRECEDED BY-~ 
3XB 
3Xp 
< 0 
negative of the negative externality a commodity that is internalized 
in the same way as a positive externality. The problems which this 
creates will be explored by reference to the mechanism envisaged by 
Coase and others. 
I The following presentation draws on a graphical exposition by 
Turvey, later adopted by Kneese and Bower.10 The last two authors 
qualify their acceptance of the theorem in a long-run context, as we 
shall note, but not for the short run. 
As in Section 2, above, two industries, A and B, are assumed to be 
producing conventional outputs A and B as well as (in the case of A) 
producing pollution and (in the case of B) being constrained by A's 
TABLE 2 
INTERNALIZATION MARKETS 
INDUSTRY 
COMMODITY 
A (SUPPLY) B (DEMAND) 
axN 3XN 
NECTAR 
3Xp axpPOLLUTION 
production of pollution. Coase discusses the process in the context 
of bilateral monopoly, whereas our parametric treatment of prices 
is most consistent with universal pure competition. The situation 
with bilateral monopoly will be noted at a later point. 
Consider Figure 1. The negatively sloped line is a supply curve for 
pollution expressed indirectly through marginal profits on output A. 
Outputs A and P are simultaneously expanding. If the expansion takes 
place with strict jointness in the production of A and P, there is a 
unique downward-sloping supply curve of pollution. If the output 
takes place with variable proportions of A and P, then the pollution 
supply curve depends on both prices PA and PB. See Tables 1 and 2. 
B 
INPUT AND OUTPUT

INCREASE TOGETHER,

PN PRECEDED B Y  ­

INPUT AND OUTPUT 
ARE SUBSTITUTES 
Pp PRECEDED BY + 
3. The Coase 
Theorem 
FIGURE 1 
COMPENSATION EQUILIBRIUM 
10
 See Turvey [14] and Kneese and Bower [11], p. 100. PRICING OF POLLUTION / 257 
We shall allow XA and XP to vary independently but assume that 
the single downward-sloping curve in Figure 1 represents prices con­
sistent with the processes to be described—in particular, with a com­
pensation equilibrium at point S. PP = 0 at point Z by construction. 
Thus, industry A is in equilibrium at Z without internalization. 
The upward-sloping line indicates increasing marginal losses to 
B as output P is expanded and, by hypothesis, received by B. This is 
a demand curve for pollution with a compensation regime. See 
Tables 1 and 2. Variable proportions of input P and output B are 
possible; therefore, it is necessary to assume prices PP and PB such 
that the compensation equilibrium is reached at point S and there is 
no internalization of pollution at point Z. Industry B is assumed, for 
the time being, to have no transferable resources. 
The units on the two vertical axes are adjusted so that equal 
vertical distances give equal dollar quantities. The production condi­
tions of Section 2 are carried over so that both industries A and B 
have linear homogeneous production functions. At the compensation 
equilibrium, XP = S and we shall let PP = K. Then by virtue of 
linear homogeneity, there is complete exhaustion of product: 
TA = PAXA -KS- wLA - rCA = 0 (la) 
TTB = PBXB + KS ~ wLB - rCB = 0. (3a) 
The bribery mechanism can be best understood with a supply and 
demand interpretation. To the right of XP = 5, industry B will, 
minimize losses by paying A a bribe not to pollute. The bribe will 
give A more income than would the production of commodity A for 
sale in the market (with simultaneous production of P). To the left 
of Xp = S, industry iTs losses are not as great as the size of the 
bribe that would be required to induce A to withhold production. 
Hence, equilibrium results again at XP = S. Note that B's curve is 
now a demand for abatement, downward sloping from right to left, 
and A's curve is a supply of abatement, upward sloping from right 
to left. 
The essential assumption in the argument is that pollution abate­
ment can be treated as a commodity to be internalized. Call this com­
modity "withheld pollution,1" or "withholding," W. Then J = M^and 
all the same marginal conditions apply as with/ = N. Assume for the 
time being that the level of output from which pollution will be with­
held is known and accepted by all parties. This is the noninternalized 
level XP = Z, which obtains when PP = 0. Then 
XW = Z- XP. (13) 
Since Z is a given constant, 
dXw 
= - 1 . (14) 
dXr 
Internalization by bribery can be produced by commodity W in 
the general model with / = W, a plus sign before Pw in (1), and a 
negative sign before Pw in (3) to give 
dXA BXB 
Pw = - PA- = Pa . (15) 
dXW dXw258 / RICHARD A. TYBOUT
Now, as a consequence of (14), our previous equilibrium with PP 
can be turned into an equilibrium with Pw '• 
dXA dXB 
Pw = PA 3 (16) 
Xp—S dXP 
The marginal conditions of general equilibrium with "withholding" 
are identical but of opposite sign to those with pollution at the same 
level of output XP = S. Total profits with bribery are 
TA = PAXA + K(Z - S) - wLA - rCA = KZ (lb) 
m = PBXB - K(Z - S)~ wLB - rCB = ~ KZ. (3b) 
Writers in the Coase tradition typically hold that the lump sum 
transfer KZ shown in (lb) and (3b) as compared with (la) and (3a) 
is of distributional significance only (ignoring, as we do, indirect 
effects on the structure of demand). 
I A statement of the total-profits anomaly appears in Bramhall and 
Mills.11 Referring to industry B, they hold: 
Under the payments scheme [compensation], profits will be larger than they would 
have been in the absence of intervention, and under the fees scheme [bribery] 
profits will be smaller than in the absence of intervention. On the usual assump­
tions about entry and exit, entry will take place in the former case and exit in the 
latter case. 
Wellisz12 had previously made the point that for the Coase mechanism 
to hold, it is necessary to postulate nontransferable resources with 
Ricardian rents. We shall investigate the implications of transferable 
resources. 
• The compensation case. Production-expansion curves are shown 
in Figure 2 for the compensation case. The purpose of the curves is 
to show that the adjustment process is smooth, continuous, and 
follows conventional economic principles with compensation, in 
contrast to the situation we shall find with bribery. Figure 2 also 
gives information useful for the analysis of the bribery case and, in 
fact, can be reinterpreted for a bribery regime, though most of such 
reinterpretation will be left for the reader after the difficulties of 
bribery have been presented. 
Figure 2(a) gives transformation curves (concave to the origin) 
for outputs A and P in industry A, each curve subject to a fixed 
resource constraint, which, in this case, is a real fund available for 
capital and labor at wage rates and interest rates fixed elsewhere in 
the economy. The transformation curves include positively sloped 
segments which imply that commodity A and pollution P outputs 
expand simultaneously over a part of the range. If there were not a 
positively sloped segment of each curve, there would be no pollution 
output in the first place. With strictly joint products, the trans­
formation curves would collapse to a single ray from the origin, 
each point along which would correspond to different resource 
inputs, as well as different outputs. The slopes of the transformation 
11
 In [3], p. 616.

12
 In [15].
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curves at each point correspond to price ratios and represent iso­
proflt loci.13 
—f-) = 0, the 
aXp/ 
( dX \ —  - ) > 0. Since industry A obtains revenue from 
output A, but not from P, the only points of interest are on the 
positively sloped parts of the transformation curves to the left of 
/dX \ 
the expansion curve ( —  - ) = 0. This last represents, of course, the 
expansion path that industry A would take in the absence of any 
charge assessed for pollution: PP = 0. Compare equation (10). To 
relate Figure 2(a) to Figure 1, the equilibrium points XP = Z and 
XP = S are shown. These correspond to points Fand U, respectively, 
in Figure 2(a). 
Figure 2(b) is constructed in the same way. The curves concave 
to the origin show transformation trade-oifs of output B and input P 
with alternative quantities of fixed total resources. There are no 
positively sloped parts of these curves. Input P retards the production 
of output B and the latter retards the assimilation of P, each over 
the entire range. A possible expansion path of industry B to point F, 
the compensation equilibrium, is shown. With demand and supply 
fixed, the transformation curves are also isoprofit curves with slopes 
equal to price ratios.14 Looking back to the origin from point F, the 
13
 The slopes of these curves can be found as follows. First, note that the 
marginal profits from commodity A are given by 
dirA dXp OJLA 3CA 
If we define 
OXA 3XA 3XA 3AA 
it can be shown that 
OLA. = PA ­ w—
d XA
Lim dir
 r-—,
 O XA 
= 0.
 (n) 
 (iii) 
dXA 
Rearranging (i) with zero marginal profits then gives 
}3LA __ 6CA 
rdXA	 (iv) 
dXA Pp 
which expresses the slopes of the production transformation curves at all equi­
librium values of the indicated parameters and marginal conditions. Since WLA 
d Xp dXp 
+	 rCA is constant for any given contour of Figure 2(a), =  - — and the 
3X Xslopes shown in (iv) are reciprocals of the slopes shown in Figure 2(a). 
14
 The slopes of the transformation curves shown in Figure 2(b) can be under­
stood by reference to exactly the same kind of relationships described in note 13, 
above. Thus, marginal profits from commodity B are given by 
dXs dXs &XB 
and by exactly analogous reasoning, it can be shown that with zero marginal 
dLB dCB 
dXp dXs &XB	 /..^ 
.	 (u) 
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transformation contours represent higher and higher levels of margi­
nal and average profits that could be achieved by a contraction of the 
industry with parametric increases in prices PB and PP. 
No problems of adjustment are presented by the expansion curves 
in a compensation regime. Industry A can simultaneously expand or 
contract XA and XP in all combinations. Industry B can simul­
taneously expand the output of XB and the input of XPi for both of 
which it receives compensation along a common expansion curve. A 
reduction in demand consists of moving the positively sloped curve 
to the left in Figure 1; an expansion, to the right. Symmetrical move­
ments of the negatively sloped supply curve produce expected results 
in the compensation price. Stability conditions are conventional, as 
noted in Section 2. 
• The bribery case. Consider the situation with bribery. Industry A 
may expand, but it is not clear what will be produced. With Z held 
dXA
constant, - ^  - < 0 is a property of all expansion curves for industry 
dXu 
dXAA.	 See Figure 2(a), which is consistent with > 0 and equation 
dXp 
(14). One solution is to drop equation (14) and assume that witholding 
is sold from some level of XP > Z. Whether this is a possible result 
depends on 2?'s willingness to believe that A would, in fact, produce 
pollution at a level greater than Z. Point Z represents A'$ noninter­
nalization optimum. Expansion in industry A might take place by 
balancing losses from A and W at the margin until the total profits 
in industry A are zero, but economic theory gives us no guidance 
as to whether or by what expansion path this will be done. In Figure 
2(a), marginal profits are zero at point U, though total profits are 
KZ. See equations (15) and (lb). 
The difficulty arises from a conflict between marginal and total 
profits. Marginal profits are zero at XP = S with bribery because 
industry A is being paid the marginal cost of curtailing pollution 
which, even with variable proportions, means a reduction of output 
A. Coase emphasized marginal profits; Bramhall-Miils, total profits. 
Total profits cannot help influencing the adjustments, but when there 
is a conflict between total and marginal profits, the outcome is a 
behavioral question. Stability is not assured, even if we assume that 
B has infinite resources with which to pay bribes. 
Now, let us assume away instability in industry A, Assume that 
new competition is prevented by one means or another from entering 
industry A and that demand and cost conditions remain as previously 
given for A. Long-run contraction of XB will raise the price PB and 
result in higher marginal profits ——. A bribery equilibrium might 
OX 
be established if PB is raised high enough to offset the lump sum 
transfer. Whether this will happen depends on a complex set of 
circumstances. See Figure 3, which is a reproduction of Figure 1 with 
the right-hand axis reversed in sign. The left-hand axis remains as 
« y l y 
With WLA + rCA constant, = ——, and hence the slopes in (ii) are the 
reciprocals of those shown in Figure 2(b). 
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before. The dotted lines show upward shifts in marginal profits to 
industry B as contraction takes place. 
A total profits equilibrium is reached by B if some positive level 
of marginal profits results in zero total profits with bribery. Such an 
equilibrium is shown at point R. The reader can verify that if the 
curves were folded over with negative profits increasing upward as 
in Figure 1, the supply-demand "equilibrium" would move down the 
curve —^- versus XP. The vertical lines indicate points of bribery dXp 
"equilibrium" in the process. Points R and Rf are alternative equi­
libria. At Rf, marginal profits are negative. At R9 they are positive. 
Industry B shifts discontinously from Rf to JR because at this point 
its demand curve has moved far enough upward to make R avail­
able. At R, industry B is receiving high enough marginal profits 
from sales of commodity B to pay the bribe and break even in the 
long run. 
The above result, however, is sensitive to the shape of the curve 
#•> * \ 
£ versus XP. If this curve is less bowed than —™ versus XP, equi-
OX 
librium will be at either XP = Z or at XP = 0. In the former case, 
no bribery is paid; industry B is absorbing pollution and earning 
high enough marginal profits to stand the real loss and break even 
in total profits. In the latter case, industry B buys off all pollution 
it would otherwise have received from A. The relevant quantity XP 
received by B depends on the size (level of activity) in B as well as 
A. Pollution is a private good in the present context. This does not 
change the analysis but means that the scale on the horizontal axis 
in Figure 3 (and other figures) should be changed as the size of 
industry B (or A) changes. 
To this point, only the problems of independent adjustment in 
A and B have been considered. Interdependent adjustment is compli­
cated by uncertainty about the level of Z from which withholding is 
measured. Knowledge and agreement on this level would seem un­
likely in a dynamic context.15 
• Conclusions. It is possible that a stable total profits equilibrium 
of bribery might be achieved in a dynamic context; but the require­
ments, as described above, make it implausible. These requirements 
include: agreement between A and B on the value of Z from which 
withholding is to take place; demand and supply curves for with­
holding that have the right relative bow to permit a tangency solution 
as in Figure 3; and some part of Bn$ bribery contraction curve with 
positive total profits, and these profits high enough to pay the bribe. 
This last condition depends on the relative sizes of industries A and 
B. Size affects the relative prices for conventional commodities A 
15
 Kamien et al. [9] discuss a different kind of dynamic adjustment. They 
do not consider the problems discussed above, but analyze the case where in­
dustry A might adjust due to such normal causes as increasing demand for output 
A. Their work conforms to tradition in assuming a single valued function 
XP = /(XA) with XA independently produced. They consider the case where Z 
is not known but bribery is based instead on the quantity of Xp that is produced 
and removed by treatment. With the decision rule for bribery based on the amount 
treated rather than the amount withheld, they find both XA and Xp produced in 
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and B and also the internalization price JV. Finally, there is the 
conflict of marginal and total profit conditions in A. B may find it 
possible, through contraction and increases in marginal profits in 
other lines, to pay the bribe. But A will be receiving a lump sum 
transfer beyond returns at zero marginal profits, which can only be 
offset by expanding to negative marginal profits levels elsewhere as 
long as the bribe is received and total profits are above normal. 
Do these results depend on the reference base from which we 
started, viz., zero profits in industry B in the absence of any pollu­
tion? Such a base is entirely proper for the linear homogeneous pro­
duction functions assumed. But let us relax the assumption of linear 
homogeneity. What are the conditions that would keep total profits 
at the zero level in equations (1b) and (3b) with K, S, and Z also as 
variables? The obvious answer is that somehow the effect of the 
lump sum transfer must be offset, or approximately offset, by the 
other transactions in these industries when marginal conditions are 
satisfied. Strict linear homogeneity may not characterize very many 
production functions, but it probably becomes closer than would a 
pair of lump sum production functions geared to produce deficits 
in A and surpluses in B so that they could be offset by bribery 
transactions. 
It is interesting to note that difficulties of a qualitatively similar 
sort are encountered in marginal cost pricing for increasing returns 
industries, though in the increasing returns case, the problem arises 
from physical production conditions. In the bribery case, it arises 
from a lack of correspondence between physical and financial 
conditions. Bribery would match a linear homogeneous physical 
production function with financial relationships that cannot lead to 
exhaustion of product. 
Compensation, in contrast, creates no such distortions but 
produces conventional market adjustments and stable equilibria. 
• Blackmail. Professor Coase expressed concern that if compensa­
tion were paid, the damaged party would intensify his activities so as
to justify the award of greater damages.16 The same fear was ex­
pressed by Kneese in an earlier work,17 in the situation where a mem­
ber of industry B threatens to locate downstream of a firm in in­
dustry A. Either way, the latter is faced with making more com­
pensation payments. 
The fear is groundless in a competitive setting. The Coase version 
has our industry B shifting toward more than optimal absorption of 
waste, which, of course, is in conflict with economic rationality. The 
Kneese version can be resolved by asking whether B is moving 
toward or away from optimal adjustment. If B could make a profit 
with the competitive level of costs and prices, including compensa­
tion, then B's locating at that point is socially desirable. It is then A 
whose operations are subject to question from the standpoint of a 
welfare maximum. If not, then A has nothing to fear. 
Needless to say, a competitive solution is not to be expected in all 
cases. Market structures are not perfect; nor is knowledge a free 
16
 See [5], pp. 32-33.

17
 See [10], p. 58.
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good. Bilateral monopoly and/or imperfect knowledge can make 
blackmail possible. But blackmail then becomes, in the relevant sense, 
another name for market imperfection and is not unique to the pro­
cess of internalizing through compensation. Those who believe 
bribery to be viable could equally well refer to blackmail possibilities 
for this case and, in fact, Kneese and Bower use the blackmail argu­
ment as a reason for recommending against bribery.18 
• Third party pricing. Third party pricing refers to the institutional 
arrangement where a third party, presumably a Public Authority, 
sets pollution charges and supervises the conduct of any internalizing 
transactions. In many contexts, the Public Authority also conducts 
waste treatment. 
Kneese and Bower recommend that the Public Authority col­
lect a tax but pay no subsidy, on the ground that completing the 
transaction would "lead to inefficient longer-term adjustments."19 
They state, citing Boyd: 
If . .  . the right to the use of an asset (or resource) is made contingent upon 
engaging in a particular activity, and the right to the use of the asset given free to 
parties engaging in that activity, excessive activity in that line will be generated.20 
Compensation and bribery are viewed symmetrically, as by 
Bramhall and Mills.21 There is the additional twist that the right to 
use or not use the waterway for waste removal is treated as an asset. 
This point of view is made clearer in another passage by Boyd. 
The economic maximization model presented here treats the river basin as a 
multiple-product natural asset. The products of this asset are flows of two types 
of service, a vector of waste removal services and one of water quality services. 
The quantity of the latter services available at a given location depends on 
quantities of the former consumed at upstream points.22 
The implied course of action is to charge a rent to both the waste 
disposer and the quality user. This treats the river facilities as a com­
mon asset the use of which should be rationed. It can easily be shown 
that rationing is quite a different process from internalization. The 
difference is in the sign that precedes the terms in the objective func­
tions (1) and (3). Labor and capital inputs are being rationed to 
both industry A and industry B. Well-known first-order conditions 
require that the marginal value products of each be the same in all 
uses and equal to the wage rate and interest rate, respectively. In 
contrast, pollution effects enter (1) and (3) with opposite signs. A 
and B are on opposite sides of the market in which the pollution 
externality is to be internalized. 
One of the implications of the foregoing is that ownership must be 
functionally identified with the commodity to be rationed (or dis-
commodity to be disrationed). Decentralized decision-making is 
possible if property "rights" (responsibilities) are forced on industry 
A so that if pollutants produced by A were received by B, compensa­
tion would be due the latter and B would become "owner." That this 
18
 In [11], pp. 104-5. 
19
 Ibid., p. 100. The word "subsidy" is theirs. It has inappropriate connotations 
for an internalization payment.
20
 Ibid., p. 87. 
21
 In [3]. 
 22
 [2], pp. 199-200. Italics are in the original. 264 / RICHARD A. TYBOUT
is not institutionally impossible is suggested by the contemporary 
existence of waste removal firms and enforced ownership of wastes, 
particularly of solid wastes in the form of trash, where payment for 
removal takes the form of compensation to the remover. In the river 
basin case, we found that the true rationing problem was not of 
river capacity but of downstream removal capacity. 
• Public goods. The logic of private goods analysis is equally ap­
plicable to public goods such as aesthetic and recreational damages. 
As long as partial equilibrium models are used, the optimum level 
of pollution and the compensation price can be determined from the 
vertical summation of (positively sloping) demand curves of damaged 
public goods recipients. 
An unexpected windfall results from the reversal of the trans­
action, as required by compensation. In contrast to the situation with 
positive public goods, where the prospect of paying one's demand 
price gives an incentive to conceal demand, there is with negative 
public goods and compensation the incentive to reveal demand.The 
Public Authority is likely to have ample information volunteered 
from damaged parties (and from some not damaged). Its problem 
would be more that of establishing authenticity and accuracy. 
The last is a form of the blackmail problem. One way to deal 
with it is to make compensation in the form of additional treatment to 
remove more pollution. Instead of paying compensation in financial 
terms, the control of blackmail might force the payment of compensa­
tion in kind. Only authentic damage receivers will benefit from having 
additional pollution removed. 
It is obvious that payment in kind by the above system introduces 
inefficiencies. By the definition of optimum treatment as the supply-
demand equilibrium, there will be nonoptimal (excessive) treatment. 
The reader is left to catalog other sources of inefficiency. Neverthe­
less, compensation gives us another approach to the problem of 
public goods pricing (albeit only for negative public goods). We are 
probably no further from an optimal translation of theory into 
practice with compensation than we are with conventional public 
goods pricing. 
• Variables
C Quantity of capital.

L Quantity of labor.

P Price.

r Return on capital.

w Wage rate.

X Quantity of commodity.

A Lagrange multiplier,

x Profits.

• Subscripts and superscripts 
A Industry or commodity.

B Industry or commodity.

 Glossary of 
notations 
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J All-purpose subscript that can take on meaning of N, P, or W. 
N Nectar. 
P Pollutant. 
W Withheld pollutant. 
References 
1.	 BATOR, F. M. "The Anatomy of Market Failure." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 72, No. 288 (August 1958), pp. 351-79. 
2.	 BOYD, J. H. "Collective Facilities in Water Quality Management," in A. V. 
Kneese and B. T. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology 
and Institutions, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, Appendix to 
Chapter 10. 
3.	 BRAMHALL, D. F. and MILLS, E. S. "A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees 
and Bribes." Water Resources Research* Vol. 2, No. 3 (July-September 1966), 
pp. 615-16. 
4.	 BUCHANAN, J. M. and STUBBLEBINE, W. C. "Externality." Economica, Vol. 
29, No. 116 (November 1962), pp. 371-84. 
5.	 COASE, R. H. 'The Problem of Social Cost." The Journal of Law and Eco­
nomics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (October 1960), pp. 1-44. 
6.	 DAVIS, O. A. and WHINSTON, A. B. "Externalities, Welfare and the Theory 
of Games." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70, No. 3 (June 1962), pp. 
241-62. 
7# m "Some Notes on Equating Private and Social Cost." Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (October 1965), pp. 113-26. 
8.	 DOLBEAR, F. T., JR. "On the Theory of Optimum Externality." The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 1967), pp. 90-103. 
9.	 KAMIEN, M. J., SCHWARTZ, N. J., and DOLBEAR, F. T., JR. "Asymmetry 
Between Bribes and Charges." Water Resources Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 
(January-March 1966), pp. 147-57. 
10.	 KNEESE, A. V. The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management. 
Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 
11.	
 7 and BOWER, B. T. Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, 
and Institutions. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 
12.	 K.UENNE, R. E. The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium. Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1963. 
13.	 MEADE, J. E. "External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive 
Situation." Economic Journal, Vol. 62, No. 245 (March 1952), pp. 54-67. 
14.	 TURVEY, R. aOn Divergences Between Social Cost and Private Cost." 
Economica, Vol. 30, No. 119 (August 1963), pp. 309-13. 
15.	 WELLISZ, S. "On External Diseconomies and the Government-Assisted 
Invisible Hand." Economica, Vol. 31, No. 124 (November 1964), pp. 345-62. 
266 / RICHARD A. TYBOUT 
